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Note
PENA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: ELEVATING A
CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTION ABOVE THE TANNER
FRAMEWORK
CAROLINE COVINGTON
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,1 the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed whether post-verdict juror testimony about racial bias
during jury deliberations is a constitutionally mandated exception to Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“Rule 606(b)”)2 and its state analogues.3 Although
jurors are generally barred by the “no-impeachment rule” from testifying
about the deliberation process to question the validity of the verdict, the Court
ruled that the Sixth Amendment4 requires that Rule 606(b) give way to allow

© 2018 Caroline Covington.
 J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author would like to thank her editors Brett Turlington, Daniel Scapardine, and Catherine Gamper,
for their invaluable feedback and flexibility during the writing process. The author also wishes to
thank her mentor and advisor, Professor Danielle Citron, for her guidance and support throughout
law school, as well as Professor Lee Kovarsky for his time and insight on this Note. The author
dedicates this Note to her husband, Kevin Connors, who offers unwavering support and patience,
and voluntarily married a law student.
1. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
2. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). The Rule states, in part, that a juror “may not testify about any
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on
that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or
indictment.” Id. For the full text of the Rule, see text accompanying infra note 107. Rule 606(b)
is commonly referred to as the “no-impeachment rule” because the losing party is generally
prohibited from impeaching the verdict through juror testimony about the deliberation process with
three exceptions. Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. 2013).
3. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 859. Forty-two states, including Colorado, have adopted a
rule or statute modeled after Rule 606(b), which generally prohibits jurors from testifying as to any
statement made during deliberations if that testimony is offered to challenge the validity of a verdict.
Benjamin T. Huebner, Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework for Postverdict Juror Testimony,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469, 1487 & n.96 (2006). Colorado’s Rule 606(b) is practically identical to the
Federal Rule. Compare FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (“During an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict . . . a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury’s deliberations . . . .”), with COLO. R. EVID. 606(b) (“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict . . . a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury’s deliberations . . . .”).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states that “the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.” Id.
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the trial court to consider evidence of a juror’s reliance on racial animus to
convict a criminal defendant.5
The Court correctly held that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury should take priority over a rigid application of Rule 606(b) when a jury
member produces evidence of racially biased statements during
deliberations.6 As jurisdictions that allow racial bias exceptions demonstrate,
the Court’s exception will not impede the policy goals advanced in support
of Rule 606(b).7 First, an exception for juror testimony on racial bias will
not disrupt the finality of verdicts nor increase post-verdict litigation because
the Court narrowly tailored the exception to apply only in instances where
the racial bias cast substantial doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the
verdict.8 Additionally, courts are already well-equipped to implement
procedures to receive juror testimony under the Court’s exception that will
not compromise the privacy of jury deliberations.9 Rule 606(b) already
permits disclosure under its enumerated exceptions about what happened in
the jury room if the testimony concerned prejudicial extraneous information
and outside influence.10 Courts can use these same procedures to receive
testimony under one of the Rule’s exceptions to receive testimony on racial
bias within deliberations without significant intrusion into the inner workings
of the deliberative process.11 The Court’s exception will also not increase
post-verdict harassment of jurors because of existing professional and local
rules that restrictively govern contact with jurors.12 Lastly, the Court’s
decision was correctly decided because it promotes public confidence in the
fairness of the jury system by allowing consideration of whether racial bias
affected a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.13
The Court, however, erred when it failed to adequately base its decision
on the insufficiency of current procedural safeguards enumerated in United
States v. Tanner.14 In Tanner, the Court declined to mandate a constitutional
exception to Rule 606(b), precluding the defendant from introducing juror
testimony about other jurors’ alleged intoxication and drug use.15 The Court
reasoned that any Sixth Amendment concerns to Rule 606(b) were addressed
by four procedural safeguards: voir dire, court and counsel observation of
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
483 U.S. 107 (1987); see infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part II.C.1
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jurors, non-juror evidence, and pre-verdict juror testimony.16 Following
Tanner, the Supreme Court as well as lower courts relied on the Tanner
procedural safeguards to foreclose any constitutional challenges to Rule
606(b)’s exclusionary practice of evidence of juror bias during
deliberations.17 Rather than work within this established Tanner framework,
the Pena-Rodriguez Court incorrectly reasoned that a constitutional
exception to Rule 606(b) was necessary to combat systematic racism within
the criminal justice system.18 As a result of its flawed reasoning, the
majority’s opinion inadvertently gives rise to a preferential system of bias
that disregards other types of equally damaging juror bias.19 The Court
should have decided the case based on the insufficiencies of the Tanner
safeguards in the context of racial bias to protect a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.20
I. THE CASE
In May 2007, a man was accused of sexually assaulting two teenage
sisters in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing track.21 The girls
separately identified an employee of the racetrack, Petitioner Miguel Angel
Peña-Rodriguez, as the perpetrator.22 Peña-Rodriguez was charged with one
count of attempted sexual assault on a child younger than fifteen, one count
of unlawful sexual contact, and two counts of harassment.23 Prior to trial,
potential jurors were questioned during voir dire24 about whether they could
be fair and impartial in the case.25 None of the subsequently empaneled jury
members expressed racial or other bias.26 The jury found Peña-Rodriguez

16. See infra Part II.C.1.
17. See infra Part II.C.1.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Voir dire is the process by which the court evaluates prospective jurors to ensure
impartiality and suitability for jury service. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987); see
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1982) (“Voir dire plays a critical function in
assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be
honored”).
25. Pena-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288. Potential jurors received written questionnaires asking,
“Is there anything about you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror in this
case?” Id. Additionally, defense counsel asked during voir dire whether “this is simply not a good
case for [you] to be a fair juror.” Id.
26. Id.
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guilty of harassment and unlawful sexual contact but failed to reach a verdict
on attempted sexual assault of a child.27
After the trial concluded, Petitioner filed a motion for juror contact
information, alleging that some jury members had made racially biased
remarks during deliberations.28 After the court ordered Petitioner to allege
the particular facts of juror bias, Petitioner’s counsel submitted an affidavit
stating that two jurors told her “some of the other jurors expressed a bias
toward [Pena-Rodriguez] and [his] alibi witness because they were
Hispanic.”29 Petitioner’s counsel received the court’s permission to contact
the jurors and request affidavits recalling the specific instances of bias within
deliberations.30 Subsequently, Petitioner’s counsel submitted affidavits from
jurors M.M. and L.T. alleging that another juror, Juror H.C., made racially
biased comments about Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness during jury
deliberations.31 According to the two jurors, Juror H.C. allegedly said, “I
think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they
want.”32 Additionally, Juror. H.C. made statements about Mexican men
being “physically controlling of women because they have a sense of
entitlement and think they can ‘do whatever they want’ with women.”33 The
affidavits also alleged that Juror H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty
because “in his experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men
had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they
wanted with women” and that “where he used to patrol, nine times out of ten
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young
girls.”34 Lastly, Juror H.C. was alleged to have said that he did not think
Peña-Rodriguez’s alibi witness was credible because “among other things,
he was ‘an illegal.’”35
Peña-Rodriguez’s counsel moved for a new trial, but the trial court
found that H.C.’s comments during jury deliberations were inadmissible
under Rule 606(b) of the Colorado Rules of Evidence (“CRE 606(b)”).36 The
court subsequently denied the motion for a new trial, and Peña-Rodriguez
was sentenced to probation for two years and required to register as a sex

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; COLO. R. EVID. 606(b); see supra note 3.
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offender.37 Peña-Rodriguez appealed.38 A divided Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision,39 and the Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote, holding that CRE 606(b) prohibited admission
of Juror H.C.’s testimony.40 The majority expressed concern that creating an
exception to CRE 606(b) for racial bias would undermine policy objectives
that the rule purported to achieve.41 Justice Márquez, joined by Justices Eid
and Hood, dissented, noting that the majority should have elevated a
defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial over general policy
interests.42 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
whether the constitution requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule
when a juror makes a statement indicating that “racial animus was a
significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict.”43
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to a trial
by jury in all criminal proceedings.44 The Sixth Amendment further
guarantees the criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury, free of
prejudice and bias.45 An impartial juror has been understood to be one who
can “lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court.”46 Although the right to a fair and impartial jury
37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No.
15-606).
38. People v. Pena-Rodriguez, No. 11CA0034, at *2 (Colo. App. Nov. 8, 2012), reh’g denied,
350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015).
39. Id. at *16 (referring to Juror H.C. as “Juror 11”).
40. Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 287–88 (Colo. 2015), rev’d sub nom. PenaRodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
41. Id. at 292–93.
42. Id. at 293–94 (Márquez, J., dissenting).
43. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017). The Court addressed whether
the Constitution required an exception to both state and federal codifications of the no-impeachment
rule, as applied in the case at bar in Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b). Id.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”). The Supreme
Court, however, has held that the Constitution only requires juries for criminal trials where the
prospective punishment is more than six months in prison. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–
74 (1970).
45. See supra note 4 for the relevant text of the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., McDonough
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (“One touchstone of a fair trial is an
impartial trier of fact— ‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before
it.’”(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982))).
46. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (first citing Ex Parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131 (1887);
then citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); and then citing Reynolds v. United Stated
98 U.S. 145 (1878)); see, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 417 (1987) (“[T]he Court’s
understanding [is] that jury impartiality requires only ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law
and find the facts.’” (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985))).
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is a cornerstone of the American legal system,47 the common law and
evidentiary rules designed to preserve the integrity of the process have
shielded the secrecy of jury deliberations.48 When facing allegations of juror
misconduct, courts will often prohibit jurors from offering testimony that
would impeach their verdict.49 Section II.A traces the common law
development of prohibiting post-verdict juror impeachment in American
jurisprudence as well as the Supreme Court’s early efforts to clarify its
position on the issue. Section II.B reviews the codification and legislative
history of the no-impeachment rule from its early development to adoption
into the Federal Rules of Evidence. Lastly, Section II.C examines the
Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Tanner v. United States50 and its
pervasive influence on lower courts’ interpretations of Rule 606(b).
A. The Early Era: Development of the Common Law No-Impeachment
Rule
The general rule that prohibited post-verdict juror testimony originated
from the eighteenth-century English case, Vaise v. Delaval.51 In Vaise,
English Chief Justice Lord Mansfield heard a case in which a defendant
attempted to set aside a jury verdict by presenting two juror affidavits
explaining that the jury had improperly reached a verdict through a game of
chance.52 Although English courts had consistently allowed jurors’
testimony to impeach the verdict without question,53 Lord Mansfield broke
with tradition and held that the juror affidavits were inadmissible to impeach
their own verdicts. 54 Lord Mansfield, however, held that the court may
receive evidence about deliberations from an outside source, such as
someone who observes the misconduct from a window.55 American courts
subsequently adopted Lord Mansfield’s decision in Vaise as the Mansfield
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
48. See infra Part II.A.; see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“[C]ourts and commentators alike recognize that the secrecy of deliberations is essential to the
proper functioning of juries.”).
49. See infra Part II.C.
50. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
51. (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944; 1 T.R. 11; see also State v. Kociolek, 118 A.2d 812, 815 (N.J.
1955) (“The barrier, apparently insurmountable in its original form however heinous or
reprehensible the misconduct of the jury, originated with Lord Mansfield’s decision in Vaise v.
Delaval . . . .”).
52. 99 Eng. Rep. at 944.
53. See, e.g., Dent v. Hertford (1696) 91 Eng. Rep. 546; 2 Salkeld 645 (holding that the verdict
must be set aside and new trial ordered because the jury foreman said the plaintiff should never get
a verdict in his favor); Philips v. Fowler (1735) 94 Eng. Rep. 994; Barnes 441 (allowing juror
testimony that the verdict was decided by casting lots to impeach the verdict).
54. Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944.
55. Id.
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Rule, which embodied the proposition that all juror testimony is inadmissible
for purposes of impeaching a verdict.56
1. Breaking Mansfield Tradition
While some early American courts adopted the Mansfield Rule’s
complete ban on jurors testifying to impeach their own verdict,57 other courts
embraced modified versions of the ban. The first variation to gain traction,
known as the Iowa Rule, arose from a mid-nineteenth century Iowa Supreme
Court case, Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co.58 In Wright, four
jurors offered affidavits alleging that the jury had returned a quotient verdict,
i.e., a verdict determined by the average of each individual juror’s estimate
of damages.59 Noting that prior precedent was not based on any standard
principle, “but upon its own supposed merits,” the Iowa Supreme Court
created its own rule.60 The court held that affidavits from jurors are
admissible for purposes of impeaching a verdict if they involve a matter
which did not “essentially inhere in the verdict itself.”61 Rather than focus
on the trustworthiness of juror testimony,62 the Iowa court focused on
whether the testimony was both disruptive to the stability and finality of
verdicts, as well as irrefutable.63 Affidavits alleging that the jury returned a
quotient verdict, that a jury determined a verdict by a game of chance, or that
a juror was improperly approached by a third party were admissible because
the allegations involved “fact[s] independent of the verdict itself.”64 The
court reasoned that these allegations could be “readily and certainly
disproved by his fellow jurors.”65
56. See Dorr v. Fenno, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 521, 525 (1832) (“The [Mansfield] rule is now
perfectly well settled in both countries and may be laid down to be, that the [t]estimony of jurors is
inadmissible to show their own misbehaviour . . . .”).
57. See, e.g., Pleasants v. Heard, 15 Ark. 403, 407–08, 411 (1855) (finding inadmissible juror
testimony that damages were determined by average); Murdock v. Sumner, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 156,
157 (1839) (finding juror affidavits stating that they had made a mistake in assessing damages
inadmissible on motion for a new trial); Clum v. Smith, 5 Hill 560, 560–61 (N.Y. 1843) (holding
juror testimony inadmissible because it was intended to impeach the verdict on the grounds that the
jury foreman had left deliberations to consult with outside sources on damages).
58. 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
59. Id. at 212 (“[T]he verdict was determined by each juror marking down such sum as he
thought fit, and dividing the aggregate by twelve and taking the quotient as their verdict . . . .”).
60. Id. at 209.
61. Id. at 210.
62. Id. at 210–13. The Iowa court dismissed Lord Mansfield’s reasoning about the inability of
a jury to reliably report its own misconduct and instead offered that “[a]t all events the superior
opportunities of knowledge and less liability to mistake . . . would entitle his statement to the most
credit.” Id. at 211–12.
63. Id. at 211.
64. Id. at 210.
65. Id. at 211.
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The court distinguished these types of allegations from those allegations
solely within the juror’s own mind.66 Under the court’s newly created rule,
misunderstandings of jury instructions or witness testimony during trial,
mistakes in calculating the verdict, or allegations of influential statements by
other jurors were held to be inadmissible.67 The Court also noted that while
public policy does protect those verdicts in which a juror correctly discharges
his duty, there is no legitimate public policy that can prevent a court from
considering the best available evidence to remedy unlawful juror
misconduct.68
In the years following the Wright decision, several states departed from
the Mansfield Rule’s broad prohibition on juror impeachment of the verdict.
While some states adhered to the Iowa Rule,69 others adopted narrower
interpretations that were less lenient than the Iowa Rule yet more flexible
than the Mansfield Rule’s blanket prohibition on any juror testimony.70
Rather than focus on the credibility of juror testimony, the critical factor was
whether or not the allegations took place outside of jury deliberations or
within the protected sphere of the jury room.71 Despite these variations, the
majority of jurisdictions still followed the Mansfield approach by the
beginning of the twentieth century.72
2. The Supreme Court’s Role in the Common Law Development of
the No-Impeachment Rule
The United States Supreme Court refrained from directly addressing the
admissibility of juror testimony under the common law to impeach verdicts
in United States v. Reid.73 In Reid, the Court confronted two juror affidavits
that indicated the jurors had read a newspaper article during deliberations on
the evidence presented at a murder trial.74 Rather than deem these affidavits
66. Id. at 210.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 212.
69. The Supreme Court of Kansas determined that a juror’s affidavit alleging drunken behavior
from another juror during deliberations was admissible under the Iowa Rule because it did not exist
within the juror’s own mind and was easily verifiable by the court. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539,
544–45, 546–47 (1874).
70. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Woodward v. Leavitt considered three jurors’
testimonies alleging that juror Brown had told them he had already decided in favor of the defendant
prior to the trial. 107 Mass. 453, 459 (1871). Conversely, Brown testified that he had actually voted
for the plaintiff rather than the defendant. Id. at 459. The court found that the pretrial testimony
was admissible because it did not concern the internal deliberation process but that the second
testimony was inadmissible because “it related to the private deliberations of the jury.” Id. at 471.
71. Id. at 471.
72. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987).
73. 12 How. 361 (1851).
74. Id. at 361–62.
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inadmissible, the Court held that the defendants were not entitled to a new
trial because the newspaper article did not influence the jury’s verdict.75 The
Reid Court neither endorsed the Mansfield rule nor stated a preference for a
more flexible variation; instead, the Court focused on the benign effect of
reading the newspaper article prior to issuing a verdict.76 However, the Court
did caution that “cases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse
[juror affidavits] without violating the plainest principles of justice.”77
In McDonald v. Pless,78 the Supreme Court firmly rejected more lenient
variations of the Mansfield Rule that had developed in the United States in
favor of a more restrictive standard.79 The Court held that evidence of a
jury’s quotient verdict could not be used in this case because the accepted
rule prohibited losing parties from using juror testimony to impeach the
verdict.80 Although the Court acknowledged that litigants possessed
countervailing interests when juries arrived at verdicts based on “arbitrary
and unjust method[s],”81 the Court defended its adherence to excluding postverdict juror testimony by noting it was “the lesser of two evils.”82 In support
of its conclusion, the Court articulated three overriding policy considerations
behind upholding the no-impeachment rule.83 First, if jurors were permitted
to impeach their verdicts, the Court reasoned that all verdicts would be
challenged by losing parties who would harass the jurors to obtain testimony
to invalidate the jury’s findings.84 Second, the Court reasoned that admitting
juror testimony would destroy all frankness and freedom of discussion and
transform once private deliberations into the subject of constant public
scrutiny.85 Lastly, the Court reasoned that allowing such testimony would
undermine the finality of verdicts because it would encourage losing parties
to launch inquiries after the conclusion of trial.86 The Court reaffirmed that
it would be imprudent to provide an inflexible rule as there might be cases in
which juror misconduct is so egregious that it would merit a departure from

75. Id. at 366.
76. Id. The Court did note, “[i]t would perhaps hardly be safe to lay down any general rule
upon this subject.” Id.
77. Id.
78. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
79. Id. at 269.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 267.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 267–68.
84. Id. at 267.
85. Id. at 267–68.
86. Id. at 268.
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the no-impeachment rule as to avoid “violating the plainest principles of
justice.”87
A. The Legislative History of Rule 606(b)
The Advisory Committee’s original rule in its 1971 Preliminary Draft
conformed to the Iowa Rule’s division between testimony on the mental
processes of jurors and testimony about conditions or occurrences that
improperly influenced the verdict.88 Rather than focus on the location of the
misconduct, the proposed rule drew a distinction between testimony on
subjective mental processes and testimony concerning objective
occurrences.89 This proposed rule would have prohibited jurors from
testifying about conduct occurring during deliberations but only with respect
to its effects on the jurors’ thought processes.90 The Advisory Committee
noted that “the door of the jury room is not necessarily a satisfactory dividing
point” and that allowing jurors to testify about matters outside of their own
internal reactions does not jeopardize the values that the Committee sought
to protect.91
After reviewing comments and suggestions on the original preliminary
draft, the Advisory Committee submitted a revised draft to the Supreme
Court for promulgation in October of 1970.92 The draft was heavily criticized
by both the Justice Department93 and Senator McClellan94 as dangerously
subjecting jury deliberations to review after the verdict had been rendered.
87. Id. at 268–69 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 147 (1892)). The Court
noted that it would not attempt to enumerate or describe those types of circumstances in which a
departure from the no-impeachment rule would be applied. Id. at 269.
88. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment (quoting FED. R. EVID.
606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1971 draft); see supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text
(detailing the formation of the Iowa Rule in Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co.)
89. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).
90. Id. The rule provided:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his
mental processes in connection therewith. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any
statement by him indicating an effect of this kind be received for these purposes.
46 F.R.D. 161, 289–90 (1969).
91. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules. The Committee
noted, “[t]he values sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include freedom of
deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and
embarrassment.” Id. (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915)).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 3 (1973).
93. 117 CONG. REC. 33,648, 33,655 (1971) (“Recent experience has shown that the danger of
harassment of jurors by unsuccessful litigants warrants a rule which imposes strict limitations on
the instances in which jurors may be questioned about their verdict.”).
94. 117 CONG. REC. 33,642–48 (Letter from John L. McClellan, Senator, Ark., to Albert B.
Maris, Judge, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 12, 1971)).

2018]

PENA-RODRIGUEZ v. COLORADO

557

In response, the Advisory Committee submitted a revised draft of the “longaccepted Federal law”95 and prohibited jurors from testifying about any
matter or statement that occurred during jury deliberations.96 The new
version of the rule was sent to the Supreme Court, which subsequently
adopted the rule and referred it to Congress for approval.97
The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives rejected this
broader rule, finding that the Advisory Committee’s earlier draft was the
better practice.98 The House noted the newly revised rule could not
adequately address unjust jury verdicts nor other irregularities that occurred
during deliberations.99 The House version subsequently omitted the language
that prohibited testimony concerning any matter or statement occurring
during the jury’s deliberations.100
The Senate Judiciary Committee favored the narrower, more restrictive
interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court.101 The Senate expressed
concern that the “unwarranted and ill-advised” changes made by the House
would expose verdicts to constant scrutiny based on occurrences during the
jury’s deliberations.102 The Senate’s report reflected the policy concerns
articulated in McDonald v. Pless,103 namely that “[p]ublic policy requires a
finality to litigation” as well as promotion of free and frank discussion among
jurors during deliberations.104 After a conference was convened, the
committee adopted the more restrictive rule as passed by the Senate,105 which
Congress enacted in 1974 as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence.106
As adopted by Congress, Federal Rule of Evidence606(b) reads as
follows:
Rule 606. Juror’s Competency as a Witness . . . .
(b) During an Inquiry Into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment.
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
95. S. REP. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).
96. 56 F.R.D. 183, 265 (1972).
97. Id. at 184.
98. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 10 (1973).
99. Id. Specifically, the House was concerned about quotient verdicts and the “drunken
condition of a fellow juror which so disabled him that he could not participate in the jury’s
deliberations.” Id.
100. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).
101. Id. at 13–14.
102. Id. The Senate Report noted that allowing a losing party to challenge a jury verdict based
on testimony of the deliberation process has “long been recognized as unwise by the Supreme
Court.” Id. at 13.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
104. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 14 (1974).
105. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
106. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926.
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about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another
juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict
or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or
evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury’s attention;
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any
juror; or
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict
form.107
Almost every state, including Colorado, adopted its own version of the noimpeachment rule following the federal codification.108
C. Interpreting Rule 606(b): From Tanner to Warger
1. Tanner Takes the Stage
Following Rule 606(b)’s enactment, the Supreme Court first addressed
the contours of the rule and its limitations on juror impeachment in Tanner
v. United States.109 Prior to sentencing for mail fraud and conspiracy
convictions, defendant Anthony Tanner moved for permission to interview
jurors, an evidentiary hearing, and a new trial on the grounds of juror
misconduct.110 In support of this motion, Tanner submitted affidavits of two
jurors alleging that at least seven jurors were drinking substantial amounts of
alcohol throughout the trial.111 The affidavits also alleged that during the trial
four jurors had regularly smoked marijuana and two jurors ingested cocaine
on several occasions.112 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida denied both the motion for an evidentiary hearing and new
trial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the juror
testimony.114 The Court considered two arguments advanced by Petitioner:

107. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
108. See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017) (noting that “[s]ome version
of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every State”).
109. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
110. Id. at 112–13.
111. Id. at 113–16.
112. Id. at 115–16.
113. Id. at 116.
114. Id.
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(1) juror testimony regarding drug and alcohol use during deliberations is not
prohibited under Rule 606(b); and (2) the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
a competent jury compels an evidentiary hearing on the juror testimony.115
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, held that drug and alcohol
use during deliberations was not an outside or extraneous influence under
Rule 606(b)(2), as argued by the petitioner.116 Although the Court
acknowledged that the severe and improper effects of drugs and alcohol were
troublesome, the Court concluded that any ambiguity about the plain
language of Rule 606(b) was clarified by the legislative history of the rule.117
The Court reasoned that the legislative history demonstrated that Congress
did not intend to allow jurors to testify about juror conduct during
deliberations, including juror intoxication.118 Rather than explicitly define
what constituted an external or internal influence, the Court explained that a
rigid distinction based on the juror’s physical location was not conducive to
determining admissibility.119 Instead, the Court noted that the lower courts’
distinction based on the nature of the allegations was a more pragmatic
approach to the testimony distinction.120
The Tanner Court also rejected an argument that prohibiting testimony
of juror misconduct violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a fair trial
before an impartial jury.121 The Court reasoned that preexisting procedural
safeguards within the justice system adequately protected a party’s Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury, which invalidated any request for a
post-verdict inquiry.122 First, the Court identified voir dire as a suitable
means of detecting incompetent jurors.123 The Court also explained that court
personnel, counsel, and the judge could observe the jury during trial and that
jurors may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before the jury
renders a verdict.124 Lastly, a party may also request to impeach a verdict
through the admission of nonjuror evidence.125 Although the Court
acknowledged that some instances of jury misconduct could lead to the
invalidation of a verdict regardless of the pre-existing procedural safeguards,
the Court noted that it was unclear whether “the jury system could survive
115. Id. at 116–17.
116. Id. at 126.
117. Id. at 122.
118. Id. at 125; see supra Part II.B (providing a brief summary of the legislative history of Rule
606(b)).
119. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117–18.
120. Id. The Court did clarify that “allegations of physical or mental incompetence of a juror
[are treated] as ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ matters.” Id. at 118.
121. Id. at 127. See supra note 4 for the relevant text of the Sixth Amendment.
122. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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such efforts to perfect it.”126 Additionally, the Court noted that the allegations
of juror misconduct in the present case were not so egregious as to fall under
a common law exception allowing post-verdict inquiry.127 In light of these
circumstances, the Court determined that an additional post-verdict exception
was not necessary to protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.128
2. Circuit and District Courts Apply Rule 606(b) to Juror Bias
Federal courts have differed in approaches when determining the
admissibility of post-verdict juror testimony alleging juror bias.129 Prior to
Tanner, some courts have acknowledged that juror bias within deliberations
may be so severe that it implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to an
impartial jury.130 In Shillcutt v. Gagnon, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit noted that the no-impeachment rule cannot be applied
so inflexibly as to deny due process, and that further review may be necessary
to determine the impact of racial bias within deliberations.131 The court,
however, ultimately declined to find that the no-impeachment rule’s
prohibition on juror testimony offended “fundamental fairness.”132 Similarly
in Smith v. Brewer,133 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa struggled to reconcile a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury with Rule 606(b)’s prohibition on juror testimony
alleging bias within deliberations.134 Although the court concluded that Rule
606(b) rendered juror testimony inadmissible to impeach a verdict based on
alleged bias, the court did state that Rule 606(b) should not be blindly applied
where there was a substantial likelihood that a defendant was prejudiced by
racial bias during deliberations.135
In the wake of Tanner, the circuit courts split over whether the Tanner
safeguards were procedurally sufficient to counter any Sixth Amendment
challenges to Rule 606(b) in the context of racial bias during deliberations.136
126. Id. at 120.
127. Id. at 125–26.
128. Id. at 127.
129. See infra Part II.C.2.
130. See Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that “[t]he rule of
juror incompetency cannot be applied in such an unfair manner as to deny due process”).
131. Id. at 1159–60.
132. Id. at 1160 (holding that defendant was barred under Rule 606(b) from introducing
evidence of racial bias during jury deliberations).
133. 444 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Iowa 1978), aff’d, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1978).
134. Id. at 490 (concluding that testimony on racist juror conduct during deliberations was
inadmissible under Rule 606(b), but that evidence of racial bias “might very well offend
fundamental fairness” in certain cases).
135. Id.
136. See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rule
606(b) was not unconstitutional as applied to racial bias within the case). But see United States v.
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In United States v. Benally,137 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit considered whether excluding testimony of racial bias during
deliberations violated the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial
jury.138 The court noted that important policy considerations animated Rule
606(b)’s exclusion on testimony alleging juror bias within deliberations.139
The Benally court also considered whether testimony regarding racial or
ethnic juror comments made by a juror during deliberations fell under one of
Rule 606(b)’s enumerated exceptions.140 Though it noted that the alleged
racially biased statements were inappropriate, the court held that the juror
testimony did not constitute either “extraneous prejudicial information” or an
“outside influence.”141 Additionally, the court determined that the Tanner
safeguards were appropriate procedural mechanisms to offset racial bias
during jury deliberations which curtailed any constitutional concerns
regarding the impartiality of the jury.142
In United States v. Villar,143 the First Circuit agreed with the Benally
court that the plain language of Rule 606(b) excluded juror testimony
alleging instances of racial bias within deliberations.144 The Villar court,
however, found the Tanner protections insufficient in the context of racial
bias during deliberations.145 The Court reasoned that the Tanner protections
Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Rule 606(b) does allow inquiry into allegations
of racial bias within deliberations).
137. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008).
138. Id. at 1239. The defendant in Benally was a Native American man accused of assaulting a
federal officer with a dangerous weapon. Id. A juror came forward after the trial and alleged that
jurors made racially biased statements concerning a Native American propensity to consume alcohol
and act violently. Id. at 1239–40.
139. Id. at 1236 (“Given the importance that Rule 606(b) places on protecting jury deliberations
from judicial review, we cannot read it to justify . . . [what] Mr. Benally requests.”); see also
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the importance of the public policy
concern that “all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of
discovering something which might invalidate the finding” (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.
264, 267–68 (1915))).
140. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1236.
141. Id. at 1237 (finding that a juror making racially discriminatory comments about the Native
American defendant is best understood as internal reflections of a juror’s personal experience and
not extraneous information)
142. Id. at 1240 (“The safeguards that the Court relied upon for exposing the drug and alcohol
use amongst jurors in Tanner are also available to expose racial biases . . . .”); see Robinson v. Polk,
438 F.3d 350, 364 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that Tanner factors provided an adequate safeguard of
the defendant’s right to be sentenced by an impartial jury even though a juror read Bible passages
during deliberations).
143. 586 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2009).
144. Id. at 84 (noting that the plain language of Rule 606(b) precludes an investigation into a
verdict based on juror testimony on racial bias during deliberations). Contra United States v.
Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that racial bias is exempt from Rule 606(b)’s
restrictions on juror testimony).
145. Villar, 586 F.3d at 87.
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were particularly ineffective at detecting racial bias prior to deliberations,
implicating constitutional concerns.146 Rather than rely on a rigid
interpretation of Rule 606(b), the Villar court concluded that the Rule must
not be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony “in those rare and grave
cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate
a defendant’s right to . . . an impartial jury.”147
In Kittle v. United States,148 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
upheld a trial judge’s denial of a motion for an evidentiary hearing in
response to allegations of racial bias within jury deliberations.149 The court
reasoned that evidence of racial bias within deliberations was inadmissible to
impeach the verdict because the evidence was not an “extraneous influence”
under the plain meaning of Rule 606(b).150 The court, however, determined
that there was a countervailing interest in protecting the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury.151 The court rejected the Tanner procedural
mechanisms as adequately protecting a defendant’s right to an impartial jury
in the context of racial bias.152 To remedy disparity between the Rule’s
restrictions and the substantial constitutional interests of the defendant, the
court held that judges have the discretionary power in those “rare and
exceptional circumstances where claims of racial or ethnic bias amongst
jurors implicate the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”153 Despite the
court’s constitutional exception, it found that the trial judge acted within her
discretion under the circumstances to refuse the defendant an evidentiary
hearing on the allegations.154
3. Tanner Revisited: FRE 606(b) and Juror Bias in Warger v.
Shauers
In 2014, the Court again considered whether it should permit an
exception to the no-impeachment rule in Warger v. Shauers.155 The
146. Id. at 88. Cf. United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding
that where jurors had been openly anti-Semitic during deliberations, a new trial was necessary to
prevent prejudice from entering the justice system). Although Heller was decided prior to Tanner,
its holding reflects the view that in cases of extreme prejudice, procedural protections failed to
protect the defendant from a biased jury. Id.
147. Villar, 586 F.3d at 87.
148. 65 A.3d 1144 (D.C. 2013).
149. Id. at 1148. The defendant, an African American, requested that the trial judge declare a
mistrial, or alternatively, an investigation and evidentiary hearing about the impact of racially biased
remarks towards African Americans made during deliberations. Id. at 1147–48.
150. Id. at 1151–52.
151. Id. at 1152.
152. Id. at 1154.
153. Id. at 1155–56 (quoting United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir. 2009)).
154. Id. at 1156.
155. 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
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negligence case involved a car accident between a motorcycle and a truck,
which severely injured the motorcycle driver, petitioner Gregory Warger.156
During voir dire, a juror failed to disclose that she was partial towards the
defendant because her daughter had been at fault in a car accident as well.157
The Court unanimously determined that even if the plaintiff sought juror
testimony to prove that the pro-defendant juror had lied during voir dire, the
plaintiff was still seeking to circumvent the plain meaning of Rule 606(b) to
question the validity of the verdict.158 The Court noted that Congress had
expressly rejected a version of Rule 606(b) that would have most likely
allowed the introduction of Warger’s evidence, but nonetheless chose a rule
that reflected the more restrictive federal approach to protect the finality of
verdicts.159
The Warger Court reiterated that the Tanner safeguards sufficiently
alleviated any constitutional concerns.160 The Court reasoned that even
though voir dire failed to prevent a biased jury member, the remaining,
available safeguards were adequate to protect the integrity of deliberations
from biased jurors.161 Though the Court declined to create a constitutional
exception to Rule 606(b), the Court did not foreclose the possibility of an
exception for bias if confronted with a case involving “juror bias so extreme
that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged.”162
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
The Court recognized the opportunity to address such a case in PenaRodriguez v. Colorado.163 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held
that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicated they relied on racial
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Constitution
requires that the trial court be permitted to consider any evidence of the
juror’s statement.164 The Court first discussed the pressing need to “purge
racial prejudice from the administration of justice” and that such
156. Id. at 524.
157. Id. The juror stated during deliberations that “if her daughter had been sued, it would have
ruined her life.” Id. After jury members informed Warger’s counsel, Warger moved for a new trial
on the grounds that the juror member’s dishonesty violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and
impartial jury. Id.
158. Id. at 528.
159. Id. at 527.
160. Id. at 529. The Court also noted “any claim that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional in
circumstances such as these is foreclosed by our decision in Tanner.” Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 529 n.3. The Court also noted “[i]f and when such a case arises, the Court can
consider whether the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.”
Id.
163. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
164. Id. at 869.
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discrimination is inconsistent with the American commitment to “equal
dignity of all persons.”165 Acknowledging that confronting racial animus in
the justice system was not the sole responsibility of the legislature, the Court
traced its historical interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
prohibiting racial discrimination within the jury system.166 In order to
eradicate state-sponsored racial discrimination, the Court has prohibited
exclusion of prospective jurors on the basis of race,167 as well as held that the
Constitution sometimes demands a right to ask questions about racial bias
during voir dire.168 The Court concluded by noting that discrimination on the
basis of race, “odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.”169
The Court subsequently distinguished the present case from the drug
and alcohol abuse in Tanner170 and the pro-defendant juror in Warger171
because those circumstances were deviations from normal jury behavior.172
While the Court acknowledged that those behaviors were troublesome and
inappropriate, the Court noted that they were unique to a single jury or
juror.173 Unlike juror incompetence, the Court found that racial bias
“implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns.”174
The Court reasoned that racial bias is a unique challenge to the justice system
in that it has systematically undermined constitutional guarantees of equal
treatment under the law.175 The Court also noted that racial bias is
functionally distinct because it is less perceptible to observation than other
types of bias.176 The Court observed that voir dire can be insufficient by both
failing to expose racial bias through generic questions or by exacerbating any
existing racial bias through more focused questions.177 Additionally, the
Court noted that the attending stigma of racial bias would make it difficult
for one juror to accuse another of making racist statements during
deliberations.178 As a result of these differences, the Court reasoned that the
165. Id. at 867.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 867 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
168. Id. at 868 (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973)).
169. Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 111–112.
171. See supra text accompanying note 157.
172. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
173. Id. (finding that “neither history nor common experience show that the jury system is rife
with mischief of these or similar kinds”).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 869 (citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 195 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in result)).
178. Id.
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procedural safeguards relied upon in past cases to protect the Sixth
Amendment are not sufficient to protect against racial bias.179 Although the
Court noted that Tanner’s safeguards are potentially less effective in
detecting racial bias than other kinds of bias, that issue alone was not
“dispositive” in deciding the present case.180 Rather, the Court reasoned that
a constitutional exception addressing racial bias was essential to preventing
a “systemic loss of confidence” in jury verdicts rendered by a fair and
impartial jury.181
The Court also narrowed the circumstances in which post-verdict
inquiries into jury deliberations are permitted.182 To inquire into racially
motivated juror misconduct post-verdict, there must be a demonstration that
one or more jurors made overtly racially biased statements that “cast serious
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting
verdict.”183 The juror’s statements must show that racial bias was an
important motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.184 The Court noted
that whether this initial showing has been satisfied is a discretionary decision
of the trial court that must be made considering the totality of the
circumstances.185 State rules of professional ethics, as well as local court
rules, would guide which evidence of racial bias during deliberations will be
acquired and presented to the court.186 The Court emphasized that these state
and local rules often limit post-trial contact with jurors to provide protection
to the jurors after they render a verdict but also allow jurors to contact counsel
as in the present case.187 Lastly, the Court noted that state adoptions of the
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) were no longer bars to post-verdict
investigations of racism during deliberations.188
Justice Thomas dissented, asserting that the right to an impartial jury did
not ensure the defendant had an equal right to overturn a jury verdict using
juror testimony about misconduct or bias during deliberations.189 Justice
Thomas supported his assertion by tracing the common law development of
the no-impeachment rule and detailing the states’ various approaches to the
179. Id. at 868–69 (noting that jurors are reluctant to report inappropriate statements during
deliberations for fear of accusing another juror of bigotry and that generic questions about juror
impartiality might not expose racism).
180. Id. at 869.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. The Court noted that the trial court should consider the content and timing of the alleged
racially biased statements as well as the reliability of the juror testimony. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 869–70.
188. Id. at 870.
189. Id. at 872 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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admissibility of juror testimony on juror misconduct.190 Although there were
state deviations, Justice Thomas noted that by the latter half of the nineteenth
century, “Lord Mansfield’s no-impeachment rule had become firmly
entrenched in American law.”191 Justice Thomas argued that the majority
failed to ascribe this common law history as dispositive in its opinion.192
Although Justice Thomas recognized that there are potentially valid reasons
to depart from the no-impeachment rule, he asserted that the majority erred
by circumventing the political process that codified Rule 606(b) and ignoring
common law tradition.193
In a separate dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, Justice Alito acknowledged that there are valid policy and injustice
concerns animating the majority opinion, but that ultimately the Court
reached the incorrect decision.194 Justice Alito’s primary concern was that
the majority’s opinion would undermine the system of trial by jury that is
functionally crucial to the legal system.195 Although the Court distinguished
the present case from Tanner and Warger, Justice Alito found this argument
unpersuasive.196 Justice Alito reasoned that the constitutionality of Rule
606(b) was well-settled in both Tanner and Warger, and the Tanner
safeguards were not less effective for protecting a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment interests “in cases involving racially biased jurors.”197
Additionally, Justice Alito found no basis for the majority’s reasoning
that the Constitution was less tolerant of racial bias than other forms of
bias.198 In particular, Justice Alito found that the plain language of the Sixth
Amendment did not support the notion that the extent of constitutional
protection depended on the nature of the jury’s partiality or bias.199 Justice
Alito acknowledged that the majority had pointed to prior holdings that
endorsed constitutional protection against racial bias within the jury system
but found this ultimately unpersuasive in supporting a preferential treatment
of racial bias under the Constitution.200 Justice Alito also found that even
though racial bias is especially troublesome, it was difficult to understand
what role the “hierarchy of partiality or bias” has in a defendant’s right to be
190. Id. at 872–73.
191. Id. at 873.
192. Id. at 874.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 879.
197. Id. Justice Alito also noted that the effectiveness of these safeguards, especially in the case
of voir dire, would be more appropriately assessed in the development of state and federal evidence
rules. Id. at 881.
198. Id. at 882.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 883.
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judged impartially.201 If the Sixth Amendment required admission of juror
testimony about racial bias within deliberations, Justice Alito reasoned that
juror testimony alleging any other type of bias should be given equal
treatment.202
IV. ANALYSIS
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution requires an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) when
a juror made a clear statement of reliance on racial bias to convict a criminal
defendant.203 The Court’s decision was correct because the holding furthered
both the public policy goals of Rule 606(b) as well as the constitutional
commitment to ensuring a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.204 The
Court’s reasoning, however, was flawed because its holding should have
been structured around the inadequacy of Tanner’s procedural protections to
ensure a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury in cases of
racial bias.205 The Court incorrectly focused on the unique historical and
constitutional implications of racial bias in our criminal justice system as
justification for the constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) and its state
analogues. As a result of its inexplicable departure from the Tanner
framework, it elevated racial bias above all other types of bias that can be
equally destructive to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury.206
A. The Court’s Holding Is Correct Because It Is Consistent with Rule
606(b) and Protects the Constitutional Right to a Fair and
Impartial Jury
The Court’s constitutional exception to permit juror testimony on racial
bias is consistent with the policy considerations animating the noimpeachment rule, as codified in Rule 606(b).207 The Court’s holding is also
201. Id. at 883.
202. Id. at 883.
203. Id. at 869 (majority opinion).
204. See infra Part IV.A.
205. See infra Part IV.C. The Court listed four procedural protections for a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury in Tanner v. United States: (1) voir dire; (2) court and counsel
observations of jurors; (3) non-juror evidence of misconduct; and (4) juror reports of misconduct
before a verdict is rendered. 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987). See supra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of
Tanner v. United States.
206. See infra Part IV.C.
207. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“The values
sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include freedom of deliberation, stability and
finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment.” (citing
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915))).
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consistent with prior Supreme Court case law, which allows the possibility
of a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule when juror
misconduct egregiously threatens the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.208
First enumerated in McDonald v. Pless, and reflected in the legislative history
of Rule 606(b), there are substantial policy considerations that support the
rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach the verdict: preserving
the finality of verdicts, preventing juror harassment by losing parties, and
promoting free and frank jury discussion during deliberations.209 Rather than
defy legislative intent, the Court’s exception to Rule 606(b) strikes the proper
balance between preserving these policy objectives and upholding a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights in the face of juror misconduct.210
Additionally, the Court’s holding is consistent with the broader goal of
bolstering public confidence in the ability of the justice system to fulfill Sixth
Amendment guarantees.
1. Preserving the Finality of Verdicts and Promoting Free and
Frank Jury Discussion
Experiences from the nineteen federal and state jurisdictions that have
allowed juror testimony in instances of bias during deliberations strongly
suggest that the Court’s exception will not undermine the finality of verdicts
nor substantially increase the amount of post-trial litigation.211 Jurisdictions
that have permitted exceptions to the no-impeachment rule in instances of
racial bias continue to function without experiencing a “barrage of
postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct.”212 Among the nineteen state and
federal jurisdictions that have allowed racial bias exceptions, only fourteen
208. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014) (noting that in some instances of
juror bias, the Court may determine whether the Tanner safeguards are constitutionally sufficient);
McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268 (noting that there may be cases of egregious juror conduct that deserve
an exception to the no-impeachment rule); United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366 (1915) (noting
that certain cases may arise where it would be unjust to refuse testimony on juror misconduct).
209. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267–268; see S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 14 (1974) (“Public policy
requires a finality to litigation.”). See supra Part II.B for the legislative history of the Rule.
210. Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but Should
It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 262, 293–94 (2012).
211. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Ctr. of the Admin. of Crim. Law in Support of Petitioner at
21–22, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No. 15-606) [hereinafter Amicus Brief
of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law] (finding that racial bias exceptions have minimally increased inquiry
into verdicts); see also id. at app. A (identifying the nineteen jurisdictions which have allowed
exceptions for the no-impeachment rule as well as the outcomes of thirty cases in these
jurisdictions).
212. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987); see Brief of Amici Curiae Retired
Judges in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct.
855 (2017) (No. 15-606) (asserting that policy concerns have not been reflected in the concrete
experience of Massachusetts or other states with no-impeachment exceptions).
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out of thirty cases in which these courts considered allegations of racial bias
have resulted in new trials or further inquiries.213 Additionally, no
jurisdiction has seen more than five cases that involve inquiry into postverdict racial bias, even among those jurisdictions that have adopted the
exception.214 These jurisdictions show that the Court’s narrow exception to
the no-impeachment rule will not open the floodgates for losing litigants who
wish to impeach their verdicts, but simply allow testimony in those limited
circumstances where racial bias was a motivating factor in conviction.215
The Court’s exception to Rule 606(b) only renders testimony about
racial bias admissible if that testimony can be definitely proven.216 Under the
Court’s holding, a post-verdict inquiry into juror testimony may proceed only
upon a showing that “one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt
racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s
deliberations and resulting verdict.”217 Although the Court did not give
specific guidance to the trial courts regarding what merits a threshold
showing of racial animus as a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote
to convict,218 trial courts can implement the Court’s constitutional exception
in the same manner as courts that have received testimony under one of Rule
606(b)’s enumerated exceptions without inquiring into the mental processes
of the jurors.219 Racist behavior is often easier to corroborate or refute than
extraneous or outside influence because the racist misconduct occurs in the
presence of all other jurors during deliberations.220 As a result, Courts may
implement a hearing process to merely confirm the veracity of allegations,
thereby preserving the sanctity of jury deliberations and preventing any
increased disruption to verdicts in compliance with legislative intent.221
213. Amicus Brief of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 22.
214. Kevin Zhao, Note, The Choice Between Right and Easy: Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado and
the Necessity of a Racial Bias Exception to Rule 606(b), 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 33,
45 n.119 (2016).
215. Amicus Brief of Ctr. on Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 21; see United States v.
Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasizing that “not every stray or isolated off-base
statement made during deliberations requires a hearing”).
216. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (holding that testimony is admissible only if there
is a showing of overtly racist comments during deliberations).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Wolin, supra note 210, at 296 (explaining that a juror can testify about the objective
presence of biased conduct or comments without revealing the effect or internal mental processes
as related to the verdict reached).
220. Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1599
(1988).
221. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 14 (1974) (“Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And
common fairness requires that absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free
debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts.”); see Wolin, supra note 210, at 296 (“[T]he
policies would not be risked by permitting juror testimony concerning juror bias or prejudice to
prove its presence and not its effect on the jury.”).
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Congress passed a version of Rule 606(b) which does permit jurors to
testify on what occurred during deliberations on matters involving
“extraneous prejudicial information” and “outside influence[s].”222 Courts
have allowed juror testimony about occurrences within deliberations under
Rule 606(b)(2)(A) for accounts of a juror’s unsanctioned outside research on
evidence in a case223 as well as relating personal knowledge of the defendant
to the jury.224 The trial judge has broad discretion to create a sufficient
process to determine whether the misconduct occurred and whether it was
actually prejudicial.225 When a litigant asserts that there was juror
misconduct that improperly influenced the jury during deliberations, the trial
judge can chose whether and how to receive affidavits alleging the
misconduct and determine whether a hearing is necessary to evaluate such
claims.226 Inquiry at the hearing is limited to establishing the objective
verification of the alleged occurrence but may not extend into the realm of
the occurrence’s effects on the jury.227 The trial judge must then attempt to
“reach a subjective conclusion based on objective facts” for whether a new
trial is merited under all the circumstances.228 Using these same techniques,
trial courts are already equipped to investigate objectively verifiable
instances of juror bias under the Court’s constitutional exception without
undermining the finality of verdicts or the privacy of jury deliberations.229

222. FED. R. EVID. 606(b); see Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148–49 (3d Cir. 1975)
(noting that Rule’s exceptions for extraneous information incorporated the courts’ early awareness
that any rule that flatly prohibited receiving juror testimony concerning deliberations “contravened
another public policy: that of ‘redressing the injury of the private litigant’ where a verdict was
reached by a jury not impartial”(quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915))).
223. Kiser v. Bryant Elec., 695 F.2d 207, 214–15 (6th Cir. 1982) (admitting testimony for
purposes of new trial that a juror conducted an experiment regarding aluminum wires at issue in the
case and reported his findings back to the jury during deliberations).
224. United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that an affidavit
alleging a juror had told members of the jury during deliberations that the defendant had been “in
trouble” several times required further inquiry to determine whether or not prejudice had influenced
the verdict).
225. United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The trial judge is not,
however, shackled to a rigid and unyielding set [of] rules and procedures that compel any particular
form or scope of inquiry.”).
226. United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1483–84 (10th Cir. 1995). In Davis, the court found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing on extraneous
information introduced to the jurors but detailed the procedures for admitting such testimony for
purposes of obtaining a new trial. Id.
227. Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the
Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 532 (1988) (“Courts
have correctly reasoned that because losing litigants are prohibited from presenting evidence of the
mental or emotional processes of jurors, the trial judge should likewise be barred from making such
inquiries and may only determine prejudice by drawing reasonable inferences.”).
228. Id.
229. Amicus Brief of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 17.
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Similarly, jurisdictions that have allowed post-verdict testimony on
racial bias during deliberations have taken narrow approaches to identifying
and inquiring into juror testimony.230 These jurisdictions also demonstrate
that the court is capable of “discern[ing] the dividing line between
[statements] that are ‘clear[ly]’ based on racial or ethnic bias and those that
are . . . ambiguous.”231 Courts can distinguish between comments that merit
a new trial and those that do not by utilizing harmless-error review, which
“determin[es] whether comments made a difference in the outcome of the
trial.”232 Courts that have applied this exception prior to Pena-Rodriguez
decision have clarified that impeaching a verdict through juror testimony of
racial bias will not be granted liberally.233 Collectively, these different
approaches provide a structured inquiry into juror testimony without
compromising the privacy of jury deliberations or disrupting the finality of
verdicts.234 As a result, the Court’s exception is still consistent with finality
of verdicts and protection of free and frank discussion, while addressing valid
concerns about racial prejudice as an impediment to the Sixth Amendment.235
2. Juror Harassment
The Court’s broader application of Rule 606(b) will also not increase
post-trial juror harassment by those seeking to invalidate verdicts through

230. Brief for Amici Curiae Professors of Law in Support of Petitioner at 15–16, PenaRodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No. 15-606).
231. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 885, 884 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) (third alteration in
original) (observing that courts may be unable to distinguish between prejudicial statements and
those that are merely ambiguous).
232. Amicus Brief of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 25–26; see United States v.
Shalhout, 507 F. App’x 201, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that racially biased remarks by juror
were stray isolated comments that did not implicate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights nor
warrant a constitutional exception under Rule 606(b)); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159
(7th Cir. 1987) (determining that there was not a “substantial probability that the alleged racial slur
made a difference in the outcome of the trial”); State v. Hunter, 463 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. 1995)
(holding that the court was “unconvinced what occurred in the jury room demonstrated racial
prejudice toward [the defendant], or that [the juror] felt threatened or coerced into voting guilty”).
233. See State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 20 n.21 (Conn. 1998) (citing State v. Newsome, 682
A.2d 972, 992 (1996)) (recognizing that a new trial is only merited in instances where juror
misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial).
234. See supra notes 211–215 and accompanying text (detailing the minimal increase in postverdict litigation in jurisdictions that allow exceptions to the no-impeachment rule).
235. See Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. ON
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 203 (2011) (“Adoption of the . . . exception would preserve the
finality of the vast majority of verdicts as well as . . . address[ing] valid concerns about . . . the
injection of bias and misrepresentation into juror deliberations.”).
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juror testimony.236 In addition to the ABA rules,237 state and federal rules
regarding ethics and post-trial jury contact continue to police the interactions
between counsel and jurors post-trial.238 Many local rules prohibit parties
and counsel from contacting a juror absent a court order while other rules
prohibit parties and their counsel from contacting jurors in a manner that
amounts to harassment.239 The Court’s exception is also unlikely to increase
harassment because the existing exceptions to Rule 606(b) have already
given defeated parties an avenue to harass juries.240 Racially biased
comments during deliberations are easily verifiable through juror
corroboration without inquiring into the effect or the mental processes of the
jurors.241 As a result, parties will not receive a relaxed standard of inquiry
and are not more likely to seek to impeach the verdict through the Court’s
constitutional exception than those under the existing exceptions to Rule
606(b).
In courts that have allowed exceptions for racial bias, jurors had
proactively contacted defense counsel of their own volition and volunteered
to provide affidavits or testimony on juror misconduct.242 In some
jurisdictions, if a party fails to follow the sanctioned procedures for obtaining
evidence of jury misconduct, the court has expressed that it will not consider

236. Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599.
Contra Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting) (finding that the exception will
prompt losing parties to contact and question jurors post-verdict).
237. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.3.5 (2002) (providing general rules for contact with
jurors); Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599 (noting
that the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from harassing jurors).
238. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (majority opinion) (commenting that many jurisdictions
have rules that prohibit or restrict post-verdict contact with jurors).
239. See Crump, supra note 227, at 526–28 (providing overview of federal local rules and
restrictions on contacting jurors); see, e.g., JOINT KY. CIV. PRAC. R. 47.1(a) (“Unless permitted by
the Court, no person, party or attorney, nor representative of a party or attorney, may contact,
interview, or communicate with any juror before, during, or after trial.”); E.D.N.C. CIV. R. 47.1(c)
(“Following the discharge of a jury from further consideration of a case, no attorney or party litigant
shall . . . ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury . . . that are calculated merely
to harass or embarrass such a juror . . . .”); S.D. TEX. CRIM. R. 24.1 (“Except with leave of Court,
no attorney, party, nor agent of either of them may communicate with a former juror to obtain
evidence of misconduct in the jury’s deliberations.”).
240. Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599.
241. Supra note 220 and accompanying text.
242. Ashok Chandran, Note, Color in the “Black Box”: Addressing Racism in Juror
Deliberations, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 28, 50 (2014) (“In every case that has addressed the issue so
far, petitioners have only raised their claims once a member of the jury actively reached out and
alerted them of racist comments or behaviors that took place.”); see, e.g., Warger v. Shauers, 135
S. Ct. 521, 524 (2014) (noting that the juror contacted defense counsel post-verdict to express
concern over another juror’s pro-defendant comments during deliberations); United States v. Villar,
586 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that a juror e-mailed the convicted defendant’s counsel postverdict to inform counsel of anti-Hispanic commentary during deliberations).
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a claim of jury misconduct based on the improper methods of obtaining
testimony.243
3. Public Confidence in the Jury System
There are sound public policy goals that legitimize current jurisprudence
prohibiting juror testimony as a means to impeach the verdict, as codified in
Rule 606(b).244 Allowing verdicts to go unquestioned without further
investigation after parties have made legitimate allegations of racial bias,
however, violates even minimum Sixth Amendment requirements.245 Recent
studies have identified procedural justice, that is, perceived fairness of the
manner in which the government exercises authority, as one of the “most
important factors in shaping individuals’ views on a legal system’s
legitimacy.”246 When courts have denied defendants the ability to inquire
into allegations of racial bias during jury deliberations, it undermines the
justice system’s perceived legitimacy by potentially denying the defendant a
fair jury trial.247 The no-impeachment rule as applied in cases of racial bias
is perceived as the court’s refusal to protect defendants of color against racial
bias in jury deliberations, leading to continued distrust and lack of confidence
in the criminal justice system.248 As applied prior to the Court’s holding in
Pena-Rodriguez, Rule 606(b) “actually had the converse effect [of]
delegitimizing courts in minority communities.”249
Conversely, the Court’s constitutional exception to examine potential
racial bias in jury deliberations is a step toward remedying public confidence
that the justice system can assure a fair and impartial trial by jury for
243. See Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors—Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 417, 437–38 (1978) (detailing Minnesota state court approach to receiving post-verdict juror
testimony in which a party must “wait until they are approached by a juror or other person with
knowledge of possible jury misconduct” or petition the Court for a Schwartz hearing in which jurors
can be summoned and questioned).
244. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
245. Leah S.P. Rabin, Comment, The Public Injury of an Imperfect Trial: Fulfilling the
Promises of Tanner and the Sixth Amendment Through Post-Verdict Inquiry into Truthfulness at
Voir Dire, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 555 (2011) (“[A]llowing verdicts to stand without inquiry
after legitimate allegations of juror racism have been presented is an affront to the very foundation
of our judicial system.”).
246. Chandran, supra note 242, at 48 (citing Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Future
Challenges in the Study of Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATION 83, 83 (Justice Tankebe & Allison Liebling eds.,
2013)).
247. Chandran, supra note 242, at 50; see Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal
Process, supra note 220, at 1600 (noting that refusing to admit evidence of overt racism within jury
deliberations to overturn verdicts has a “demoralizing effect on public confidence.”).
248. Chandran, supra note 242, at 50 (noting that “[d]ecisions like Bennally can be seen as
further microaggressions; they send clear messages that the institution of ‘law’ does not care about
the concerns” of minorities).
249. Chandran, supra note 242, at 50.
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defendants of all races.250 The Supreme Court is already applying its PenaRodriguez constitutional exception by allowing defendants to expose
instances of racial bias within jury deliberations.251 On September 26, 2017,
the Court issued a stay of execution for an African American death row
inmate Keith Tharpe while it considered Tharpe’s appeal.252 Tharpe’s
attorneys, relying on the holding in Pena-Rodriguez, assert that juror Barney
Gattie’s racial bias towards African Americans was a violation of Tharpe’s
right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.253 Although Gattie
represented during jury selection that he could be fair and impartial during
the trial, Gattie signed an affidavit seven years after the trial in which he used
the n-word with reference to Tharpe and other African Americans, and
questioned whether “black people even have souls.”254 On January 8, 2018,
the Court issued an unsigned opinion remanding the case to the lower courts
to determine whether Tharpe should be permitted to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion to reopen his case.255 The Court noted that there was a
“strong factual basis” that racial bias affected Gattie’s decision to vote for the
death penalty in Tharpe’s case.256 Prior to Pena-Rodriguez, Tharpe’s
attorneys were unable to present evidence of Gattie’s racial bias under
Georgia’s no-impeachment rule.257 The Court’s exception offers protections
to defendants who were unable to present evidence of Sixth Amendment
violations before Pena-Rodriguez, as well as continued protections for a
defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights against future racial bias within

250. See Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. 2013) (citing State v. Santiago, 715
A.2d 1, 19–20 (Conn. 1998)) (“[I]f we required trial courts to ignore all allegations that jurors
expressed racial or ethnic bias during deliberations, we would jeopardize the public’s confidence in
the fair administration of justice.”); Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process,
supra note 103, at 1600 (“Permitting defendants to expose racially tainted deliberations gives the
public—particularly minority citizens—more reason, not less, to trust the final results of the
criminal justice system.”).
251. Dakin Andone & Emanuella Grinberg, SCOTUS Stays Execution of Georgia Death Row
Inmate amid Claims of Racial Bias, CNN (Sept. 27, 2017, 12:57 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/us/keith-tharpe-georgia-execution/index.html.
252. Id. Although Chief Justice Roberts previously joined Justice Alito’s dissent in PenaRodriguez, the Chief Justice did not join Justices Thomas, Alito, or Gorsuch in their dissent of the
stay of execution. Id.
253. Id. Tharpe’s attorneys also assert that Tharpe’s low IQ makes him ineligible for the death
penalty under federal law. Id.
254. Id.
255. Tharpe v. Sellers, No. 17–6075, slip op. at 2–3 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2018) (per curiam).
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id.
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jury deliberations.258 The Court correctly recognized that a rigid application
of Rule 606(b) is contrary to the goals the Rule purports to achieve.259
B. The Court Failed to Base Its Holding on the Inadequacy of Tanner
Sixth Amendment Protections
The Court’s reasoning ultimately fails to persuasively support its
holding in Pena-Rodriguez because it ignores the insufficiency of Tanner
safeguards to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as controlling in
Rule 606(b) jurisprudence.260 In both Tanner and Warger, the Court stated
that refusing post-verdict juror testimony about juror misconduct was not a
Sixth Amendment violation because there were safety valves in place to
ensure an impartial jury.261 If the Court had based its holding on the
insufficiency of Tanner safeguards to protect a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights, it would have “fit neatly into [the] Court’s broader
jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of evidence rules.”262 The
Court incorrectly reasoned that because of the unique historical and
constitutional implications of racial bias in the jury system, racial bias should
necessarily be placed within the highest tier of the “hierarchy of partiality or
bias” that the Court has inadvertently constructed.263
The Supreme Court’s decisions in both Tanner and Warger affirmed
that a defendant’s right to an unimpaired jury was sufficiently protected by
four aspects of trial: voir dire, court and counsel observation during trial,
potential use of nonjuror evidence of misconduct, and the ability of jurors to
report misconduct before a verdict is rendered.264 After Tanner, courts
refused to acknowledge constitutional challenges to Rule 606(b) on the
grounds that the Tanner protections adequately assured an individual a fair
and impartial jury.265 Despite the subsequent reliance on the Tanner
framework as applied to Rule 606(b), the Court incorrectly chose to decide
the case solely on societal concerns rather than address the inadequacy of the
258. See Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 294 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 855
(2017) (noting that a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury is of paramount
importance); United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that prejudice
in a judicial context prevents the impartial decision-making that the Sixth Amendment requires).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 90–92.
261. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127
(1987).
262. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 879 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 883; see also supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (noting that there is no
constitutional or legislative basis for the Court’s reasoning to elevate racism above other forms of
bias).
264. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 (asserting that the enumerated protections in Tanner were a
similarly adequate means of assuring juror impartiality).
265. See supra note 209.
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Tanner protections.266 The Court’s holding solely recognizes racial bias as
deserving a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule on the
grounds that racism has been and continues to be a systematic and recurring
evil throughout the history of our criminal justice system.267 As a result, the
holding suggests that the Sixth Amendment prioritizes racially or ethnically
biased juror misconduct above all other types of bias that could equally taint
jury deliberations.268 Additionally, the Court’s reliance on the unique role of
racial bias as determinative gives rise to the dissent’s main point of
contention: If the Sixth Amendment requires admission of juror testimony
about juror bias, all statements or conduct showing bias should be given equal
weight.269
The Supreme Court should have grounded its opinion instead on the
insufficiency of the Tanner Court protections in the context of racially or
ethnically biased comments made during deliberations.270 If the Court had
based its holding on the inadequacy of Tanner protections in the context of
racial bias, it would not have construed the Sixth Amendment as giving
preference to a single type of bias. A holding based on the ultimate failure
of the Tanner safeguards to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury would not give constitutional preference to racial bias, but
would grant an exception based on the Court’s accepted framework of
analyzing the constitutionality of Rule 606(b) as applied in Tanner. Though
the Court did discuss the Tanner safeguards as inadequate to protect against
racial bias, the Court’s discussion was incidental to the case rather than
determinative of the outcome.271
First, the Court should have more thoroughly addressed voir dire as a
faulty mechanism for detecting overt racism in potential jury members.272
Voir dire is often performed by the judge rather than defense counsel in both

266. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In short, the Court provides
no good reason to depart from the calculus made in Tanner and Warger.”).
267. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (majority opinion) (“[R]acial bias, a familiar and
recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.”).
268. See id. at 882–883 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s reasoning is
unsupported by the Sixth Amendment, which does not recognize a hierarchy of partiality or bias).
269. See id. at 883 (finding that the Court’s preferential treatment to racial bias subjects other
types of juror partiality to a lesser constitutional ranking).
270. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. But see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
127 (1987) (finding that Sixth Amendment interests are protected by voir dire, jury observations by
court and counsel, and admissibility of nonjuror evidence of misconduct).
271. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (majority opinion) (“The recognition that certain
types of Tanner safeguards may be less effective in rooting out racial bias than other kinds of bias
is not dispositive.”).
272. See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (“While . . . voir dire of the
jurors can help to disclose prejudice, it has shortcomings because some jurors may be reluctant to
admit racial bias.”).
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state and federal courts.273 Though unintentional, judges may inadvertently
subject potential jurors to social pressure to conform to the notion of a fair
and impartial juror because the judge is perceived as an authority figure even
if the potential juror may be neither “fair” nor “impartial.”274 Once the jurors
retire to the deliberation room, they might be more likely to reveal biases in
the natural course of deliberations rather than when asked if they are “fair
and impartial” in open court.275 Additionally, racist attitudes are often not
overtly expressed but are a result of implicit bias that a juror may not be
cognizant of during voir dire.276 As a result, direct questions on voir dire
inquiring specifically into racial bias are unlikely to identify racist jurors
through the voir dire process or observation of court and counsel.277
However, research suggests that implicit bias may be combatted by “making
race salient or calling attention to the possibility of racial bias” to “encourage
prospective jurors to reflect on their own possible biases and consciously
counter what would otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent
responses.”278
Even if courts were able to more accurately identify racist jurors through
focused questioning during voir dire,279 defendants are not guaranteed the
ability to utilize these specific voir dire techniques.280 Although a defendant
has a constitutional right to conduct voir dire into racial bias in all capital
cases where the defendant is charged with a violent interracial crime,281 the
defendant does not have that same right in all other instances. In Ristaino v.
Ross,282 the Court held that voir dire directed at racial prejudice was not
constitutionally required absent special circumstances of the case that suggest
a significant likelihood of prejudice by the jurors.283 The Court clarified that
273. Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843,
848 (2015).
274. Wolin, supra note 210, at 287 (noting that “if the judge asks potential jurors to be fair and
impartial, it is likely that many jurors will declare they are both” because potential jurors perceive
the judge as an authority figure).
275. Id. at 287–88.
276. Lee, supra note 273, at 860 (“[S]ocial scientists have convincingly demonstrated that bias
is largely unconscious and often at odds with conscious beliefs.”); see West, supra note 235, at 201
(“Because jurors may have difficulty recognizing or admitting their biases, the potential for
misrepresentations of bias may be even greater than it is for other types of juror representations.”).
277. Lee, supra note 273, at 846. But see id. at 846–47 (asserting that a series of open-ended
questions during voir dire might mitigate effects of implicit bias).
278. Id. at 867.
279. See id. at 866–69 (finding that courts can combat implicit bias during voir dire by raising
awareness of implicit bias through open ended questions and avoiding negative stereotyping).
280. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986) (holding that a capital defendant charged
with an interracial crime is entitled to have potential jurors asked about racial bias during voir dire).
281. Id.
282. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
283. Id. at 597.
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the mere fact that the defendant was a person of color and the victim of the
alleged crimes was white was not sufficient to constitute a significant
likelihood of biased jurors.284 Though the Ristaino Court noted that it was a
wiser course of action to conduct specific questioning on racial bias if
requested by the defendant,285 the Court in Rosales-Lopez v. United States286
upheld a federal court’s decision to deny a defendant’s request for racespecific questioning toward people of Mexican descent in an illegal
immigration case.287 As a result, the Court has unequivocally stated that there
is no constitutional requirement for voir dire on racial prejudice absent
special circumstances or a capital offense.288
Additionally, juror testimony in most cases is the only form of evidence
that an individual can submit after trial to confirm that jurors made biased
statements during deliberations.289 In order to insulate the jury from public
or judicial scrutiny and promote free and frank jury discussions, no outside
observers may monitor the deliberations for prejudice.290 Subsequently, the
only way to obtain objective evidence of bias during deliberations is through
a juror’s own testimony rather than observations of court or counsel.291 As a
result, visual observations of the jury by the court and counsel are unlikely to
detect jurors harboring racial bias either.292 While court observations or nonjuror evidence of misconduct might be adequate to detect juror incompetence,
such as drug and alcohol use, they are minimally effective in detecting racial
bias in the jury.293
The last Tanner safeguard—jurors reporting misconduct before the
verdict is reached—is also unlikely to protect a defendant from racial bias
during deliberations.294 Unless specifically instructed by the court, jurors
may not realize that they have the ability to report juror misconduct or that
284. Id.
285. Id. at 597 n. 9.
286. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
287. Id. at 193–94.
288. See id. at 194 (finding that it was not a reversible error to refuse the defendant criminal
racial questioning during voir dire because there were no allegations of racial or ethnic bias during
trial and no violent crimes committed).
289. Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1596.
290. See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he inner
workings and deliberation of the jury are deliberately insulated . . . .”).
291. Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599 (noting
that juror testimony about biased misconduct is easily verified).
292. United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009).
293. See id. (“[N]on-jurors are more likely to report inappropriate conduct—such as alcohol or
drug use—among jurors than racial statements uttered during deliberations to which they are not
privy.”); Lee, supra note 273, at 869–70 (noting that directly asking a juror about potential bias
would have a “patronizing” effect on the juror).
294. See Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. 2013) (observing that the Tanner
shortcomings include a juror’s reluctance to report racial bias before the verdict is reached).
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they will be barred from providing testimony after the verdict is reached
under Rule 606(b).295 Providing improved jury instructions to jurors may
still not cure a defendant’s failure to report juror misconduct prior to the
verdict. First, jurors may rationalize racism during deliberations and not
report it to the court because the juror ultimately agrees with the verdict.296
Jurors may also be unwilling to confront fellow jurors or report juror
misbehavior when they may still have to interact with the offending juror for
the duration of the trial.297 Collectively, the four Tanner safeguards are
insufficient in the context of racial bias to ensure a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury in criminal proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that postverdict juror testimony on racial bias made by a juror during the deliberations
process is a constitutionally mandated exception under Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) when the juror made a clear statement that shows they relied
on racial prejudice or animus to convict a defendant.298 The Court correctly
decided the case because precluding jurors from impeaching their verdicts
through evidence of racial bias violates an individual’s Sixth Amendment
right to a fair and impartial jury.299 The Court, however, incorrectly based its
constitutional exception on the need to address institutional evils of racism in
the criminal justice system. Rather, the Court should have created the
constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) solely because of the Tanner
safeguards’ inability to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right in the
context of racial bias during deliberations.300

295. Wolin, supra note 210, at 282.
296. See Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1023, 1033 (2008) (recounting a juror’s experience in deliberations when other members of the jury
were using derogatory gestures and language towards three African American plaintiffs).
297. See Kittle, 65 A.3d at 1155 (noting that jurors may be unwilling to come forward out of an
unwillingness to confront their peers about racist conduct).
298. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (majority opinion).
299. See supra Part IV.A.
300. See supra Part IV.B.

